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This is a ghost ship of an [argument]. One hears the creak of the
rigging, the groan of the timber, and the muted sound of voices
through the fog-but there is nothing solid to be grasped.'
I. INTRODUCrION
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits private employ-
ment discrimination on the basis of "sex."'2 In 1986, the United States
Supreme Court interpreted the "no sex discrimination" command of
Title VII to forbid sexual harassment on the job.3 In the wake of Mer-
itor Savings Bank v. Vinson,4 perhaps no single area of the law is in a
greater state of flux than the question of whether sexual harassment
by a member of one sex against a member of the same sex is actiona-
ble under Title VII. Not only do we have the spectacle of numerous
federal district courts in different circuits at odds with one another;
5
we also have district courts within a circuit at odds with each other;6
we have a single judge issuing three different opinions with two differ-
ent outcomes in the space of just six months;7 and we have the truly
1. Nogueras v. University of P.R., 890 F. Supp. 60,62 (D.P.R. 1995) (commenting on
defendants' argument that Title VII prohibits opposite-sex, but not same-sex, sexual har-
assment) (quoting Sanchez v. Puerto Rico Oil, 37 F.3d 712, 716 (1st Cir. 1994).
2. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1994).
3. Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 66 (1986).
4. 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
5. For a discussion of cases opposing same-sex causes of action see infra note 27 and
accompanying text. For a discussion of cases supporting same-sex causes of action see infra
note 63 and accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 54-59 and accompanying text.
7. Vandeventer v. Wabash Nat'l Corp., 867 F. Supp. 790, 796 (N.D. Ind. 1994) (op-
posing same-sex cause of action) (hereinafter Vandeventer (I)), on motion to reconsider,
Vandeventer v. Wabash Nat'l Corp., 887 F. Supp. 1178, 1179 (N.D. Ind. 1995) (hereinafter
Vandeventer (II)) (holding that "[s]ame-sex sexual harassment is not actionable ... may
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rare event of two district courts in almost open rebellion on the ques-
tion against their governing appellate court. In the last year alone,
district courts have issued at least fifteen opinions on the subject.
Even that number undercounts the ferment on this issue in the district
courts since there are undoubtedly numerous cases around the nation
that have been decided either without a published opinion or without
any opinion at all. Only one appellate court, the Fifth Circuit, has
directly addressed the issue, and some authorities consider its word to
be dicta. The Supreme Court has been silent, but that silence may end
in the near future. Just this past August, a same-sex harassment suit
went to a jury for the first time ever. The jury found in the plaintiff's
favor and the parties settled before it could assess damages.' Clearly,
the question of same-sex sexual harassment is one of the hottest areas
in employment law.
Moreover, the arguments marshalled for and against a cause of
action for same-sex harassment under Title VII have cut across ex-
pected ideological lines. Traditional conservative notions of strict con-
struction have been offered to support the cause of action while more
typical liberal approaches to statutory construction based on broad
and malleable notions of congressional "purpose" have been offered
to oppose the cause of action. While many advocates of legal equality
for gays and lesbians have cheered the growing recognition of the
cause of action, others fear it may lead to a backlash against gays in
the workplace and perhaps be used to intimidate homosexuals
through the threat of legal action. Indeed, some practitioners re-
port-and written court opinions seem to confirm-that the most per-
suasive arguments on behalf of a same-sex harassment cause of action
have been those that played to stereotypes of the sexually predatory
homosexual roaming the American workplace looking for unsuspect-
ing and innocent heterosexual victims. Furthermore, the "special
rights" notion often used against anti-discrimination statutes covering
sexual orientation has been implicitly employed to support recogni-
tion of this cause of action under Title VII. On this legal controversy,
perhaps on more than any other, the law has made strange bedfellows.
This Article examines the state of federal law on the question of
whether Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 provides a cause of
action for same-sex sexual harassment. It presents and analyzes the
have been overbroad"); Blozis v. Mike Raisor Ford, Inc., 896 F. Supp. 805 (N.D. Ind. 1995)
(favoring same-sex harassment cause of action).
8. See infra notes 58-59 and accompanying text.
9. Male-on-Male Harassment Suit Won, Hous. CHRON., Aug. 12, 1995, at A21.
1996]
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reasoning of those courts that have addressed the issue, with a particu-
lar focus on recent developments in the law. The Article does not
examine all aspects of a recovery for same-sex sexual harassment
under federal anti-discrimination employment law. For example, it
does not address the procedural requirements for making a claim
under Title VII nor discuss remedies, such as the measure of damages
or other relief. Further, the Article does not discuss at any length the
doctrinal elements of a claim sounding in sexual harassment. In any
event, these issues should not, require an analysis in the same-sex con-
text different from that which would apply in the more common oppo-
site-sex context. Finally, this Article does not address the numerous
state law causes of action-under either state statutes or state com-
mon law-that might support an action for same-sex harassment. In
the case of state anti-discrimination statutes, some states have explic-
itly barred employment discrimination based on sexual orientation.
Other states, like Texas, have employment discrimination laws that
closely track the language of Title VII and are ordinarily interpreted
to follow constructions of the federal law.
II. TITLE VII AND SAME-SEX SEXUAL HARASSMENT
To understand the arguments now circulating in the federal courts
on the question of whether Title VII provides a cause of action for
same-sex sexual harassment, it is important to recognize two concur-
rent developments in the interpretation of Title VII. The first is the
federal courts' refusal to read the statute as prohibiting discrimination
on the basis of sexual orientation. The second is the courts' recogni-
tion of sexual harassment as a form of sex discrimination.
It is now settled in the federal courts that Title VII's prohibition
of sex discrimination does not encompass discrimination on the basis
of sexual orientation. In the leading case, DeSantis v. Pacific Tele-
phone & Telegraph Co.,10 one of the plaintiffs complained that he was
not hired after a supervisor determined he was gay; several others
claimed that they were continually harassed and insulted by co-work-
ers because of their sexual orientation, after which they were fired or
were forced to leave to preserve their health." The Ninth Circuit
turned aside the plaintiffs' Title VII claim, reasoning that the prohibi-
tion of "sex" discrimination in Title VII "applies only to discrimina-
10. 608 F.2d 327 (9th Cir. 1979).
11. Id. at 328-29.
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tion on the basis of gender' 2 and should not be judicially extended to
include sexual preference such as homosexuality."' 3 The plaintiffs
also argued that discrimination against homosexuals disproportion-
ately affects men because of the greater incidence of male homosexu-
ality than female homosexuality and because male homosexuality is
more likely to be discovered. The court rejected this argument as
nothing more than an attempt to "bootstrap" Title VII protection for
homosexuals under the guise of protecting men generally. 4 Finally,
the plaintiffs argued that employers should not be allowed to discrimi-
nate against a man for having an "effeminate" appearance. The court
rejected that claim, too, on the grounds that it fell outside the scope of
Title VII's prohibition of sex discrimination.' 5 Other courts have
since followed the lead of DeSantis, holding that Title VII does not
prohibit sexual orientation discrimination.
16
Even as they were denying protection from discrimination based
on sexual orientation, courts began to recognize a new subset of sex
discrimination called "sexual harassment." Although a detailed re-
view of the development of sexual harassment doctrine is beyond the
scope of this Article, a brief sketch of its contours is helpful. The
Supreme Court divides sexual harassment claims into two types: (1)
those alleging quid pro quo harassment, and (2) those alleging a hos-
tile work environment. 7 Under a quid pro quo sexual harassment
claim, a plaintiff must establish that a supervisor required sexual fa-
12. Like many courts, the DeSantis panel uses "gender" and "sex" interchangeably to
mean anatomical or biological sex. See, e.g., J.E.B. v. Alabama, ex rel. T.B., 114 S. Ct.
1419, 1421 (1994) (interpreting the word sex to mean gender in an Equal Protection case).
Recently, however, some jurists have begun to recognize a distinction between gender-
the set of behavioral and dress expectations traditionally attached to biological males and
females-and biological sex. See id. at 1436 n.1 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (refusing to interpret
the word sex to mean gender because the word gender "has acquired the new and useful
connotation of cultural or attitudinal characteristics (as opposed to physical characteristics)
distinctive to the sexes. That is to say, gender is to sex as feminine is to female and mascu-
line [is] to male.").
13. Desantis, 608 F.2d at 329-30 (footnote omitted).
14. Id. at 330.
15. See Smith v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 569 F.2d 325,327 (5th Cir. 1978) (Title VII
does not prohibit discrimination based on "effeminacy"); Valdes v. Lumbermen's Mut.
Casualty Co., 507 F. Supp. 10, 12-13 (S.D. Fla. 1980) (no Title VII protection for "lesbian
mannerisms"); Ulane v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1081, 1087 (7th Cir. 1984) (Ti-
tle VII does not protect transsexuals). But cf Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228,
235 (1989) (male partners failed to promote a woman to partner at least in part because of
her alleged unfeminine qualities).
16. Williamson v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., 876 F.2d 69, 70 (8th Cir. 1989), cert.
denied, 493 U.S. 1089 (1990); DeCintio v. Westchester County Med. Ctr., 807 F.2d 304, 307
(2d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 825 (1987).
17. Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65 (1986).
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vors in exchange for job benefits.' 8 Under a hostile environment
claim, a plaintiff must establish that the harassment Was severe or per-
vasive enough to alter the terms and conditions of employment, creat-
ing a hostile, or abusive work environment and violating the
employee's right to work in an environment free from discriminatory
intimidation, ridicule, and insult. 19 The typical case involves unwel-
come sexual advances and sex-related behavior and comments by co-
workers or supervisors. The discrimination thus resulting must be
based on the employee's sex.
To defeat a motion for summary judgment in a hostile environ-
ment sexual harassment case, a plaintiff must demonstrate: (1) that
she belongs to a protected group;2" (2) that she was subject to unwel-
come sexual harassment;21 (3) that the harassment was based on her
sex;22 (4) that the harassment affected a "terms, conditions, or privi-
leges" of employment; 23 and (5) that her employer knew or should
18. See Tomkins v. Public Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 568 F.2d 1044, 1048-49 (3rd Cir.
1977) (employer violated Title VII by retaliating against plaintiff when she complained
about supervisor's sexual harassment); Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983, 989 (D.C. Cir. 1977)
(employer violated Title VII when it abolished female employee's job because she rejected
her male supervisor's sexual advances); Garber v. Saxon Business Prod., Inc., 552 F.2d
1032 (4th Cir. 1977) (employer violated Title VII by acquiescing in practice of compelling
female employees to submit to sexual advances by male supervisors); Michael D. Vhay,
Note, The Harms of Asking: Towards a Comprehensive Treatment of Sexual Harassment,
55 U. CHI. L. REV. 328, 331 (1988).
19. See Meritor Savings, 477 U.S. at 65; Note, Sexual Harassment Claims of Abusive
Work Environment Under Title VII, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1449, 1455 (1984).
20. It may be impossible not to meet this prong of the test. Because Title VII protects
both males and females, one need only plead being male or female in a sex discrimination
case. Prescott v. Independent Life & Accident Ins. Co., 878 F. Supp. 1545, 1549 n.2 (M.D.
Ala. 1995).
21. Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 903 (11th Cir. 1982). The E.E.O.C. regu-
lations helpfully define the type of conduct that may constitute sexual harassment: "sexual
advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual na-
ture .. " 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a) (1981); see E.E.O.C. Dec. No. 81-18 (1981). In order to
constitute harassment, this conduct must be unwelcome in the sense that the employee did
not solicit or incite it, and in the sense that the employee regarded the conduct as undesir-
able or offensive. Gan v. Kepro Circuit Sys., Inc., 28 FAIR EMPL. PRAC. CAS. (BNA) 639,
648 (E.D. Mo. 1982); Vinson v. Taylor, 23 FAIR EMPL. PRAC. CAS. (BNA) 37, 42 (D.D.C.
1980) (only unwelcome sexual advances generate Title VII liability); Development, New
EEOC Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex: Employer Liability for Sexual Har-
assment Under Title VII, 61 B.U. L. REv. 535, 561 (1981) ("whether the advances are un-
welcome ... becomes an evidentiary question well within the courts' ability to resolve").
22. See infra notes 72-77 and accompanying text.
23. The Fifth Circuit has held that the state of psychological well being is a term,
condition or privilege of employment within the meaning of Title VII. See Rogers v.
EEOC, 454 F.2d 234, 238 (5th Cir. 1971). The court in Rogers made it clear, however, that
the "mere utterance of an ethnic or racial epithet which engenders offensive feelings in an
employee" does not affect the terms, conditions or privileges of employment to a suffi-
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have known of the harassment and failed to take remedial action.24
Generally, to meet the third requirement, courts have required that
the plaintiff show that "but for" her sex she would not have been sub-
jected to the harassment.25
Federal courts are split whether same-sex sexual harassment may
constitute sex discrimination under Title VII, though the recent trend
appears to favor recognition of the claim. The claims have been based
on both quid pro quo and hostile environment theories. The hostile
environment claims, in turn, have involved (1) unwelcome sexual ad-
vances, and/or (2) offensive sex-related remarks and teasing not nec-
essarily meant as a sexual advance. Often, the abusive sex-related
remarks have been directed against the employee's perceived or ac-
tual sexual orientation. For the sake of clarity and brevity, I will call
the first group "unwelcome sexual advances" cases; the second, "abu-
sive treatment" cases.26 This Article will now examine the arguments
for and against recognition of same-sex sexual harassment claims
under Title VII, highlighting the more important and well reasoned
opinions.
A. Cases and Arguments Against a Title VII Same-Sex Sexual
Harassment Cause of Action
Several district courts and one circuit court have held that same-
sex sexual harassment is not actionable under Title VII. 27 These
ciently significant degree to violate Title VII. Id.; see also Cariddi v. Kansas City Chiefs
Football Club, Inc., 568 F.2d 87, 88 (8th Cir. 1977) (derogatory ethnic comments by super-
visor did not rise to level of Title VII violation).
24. Collins v. Baptist Memorial Geriatric Ctr., 937 F.2d 190, 195 (5th Cir. 1991), cert.
denied, 502 U.S. 1072 (1992). See Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934, 943 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
25. See, e.g., Polly v. Houston Lighting & Power Co., 825 F. Supp. 135, 138 (S.D. Tex.
1993).
26. I do not mean to suggest that the division between unwelcome sexual advances
cases and abusive treatment cases is always so clean. First, the recited facts in written
opinions do not always make it clear whether the harasser meant to invite a sexual encoun-
ter. Second, "abusive treatment" often has undertones of "sexual advance." Finally,
courts themselves have not explicitly recognized this dichotomy in deciding same-sex sex-
ual harassment claims. However, as will be seen, same-sex abusive treatment claims have
received a decidedly cooler response from the courts than unwelcome sexual advances
claims. The reason for that difference is unclear, except insofar as the unwelcome sexual
advances cases may conjure images of stereotypically predatory homosexuals engaging in
sexual practices that may disgust some jurists-not simply because the advances are unin-
vited, but because they are homosexual. At least one practitioner has admitted to me that
she exploits anti-gay prejudice in her efforts to induce the court to recognize same-sex
harassment in the context of unwelcome sexual advances.
27. Garcia v. Elf Atochem N. Am., 28 F.3d 446, 451-52 (5th Cir. 1994); Oncale v.
Sundower Offshore Servs., No. 95-30510, 1996 WL 223627 at *3 (5th Cir. May 20, 1996);
Martin v. Norfolk Southern Ry. Co., No CV-94-N-2928-S, 1996 WL 283911 at *5-*6 (N.D.
1996]
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courts have decided against the cause of action in the context of hos-
tile environment claims. The hostile environment claims, in turn, have
involved both unwelcome sexual advances and abusive treatment.
With one possible exception,28 there is no reported case of which I am
aware in which a court explicitly rejected a same-sex quid pro quo
claim.29
1. Goluszek and the "Dominant Gender" Theory of Title VII
The leading case holding that Title VII does not afford a cause of
action based on same-sex sexual harassment is Goluszek v. Smith,30 a
typical abusive treatment case. Goluszek worked as an electronic
maintenance mechanic. 31 Shortly after he began work at the defen-
dant's plant, his co-workers began questioning him as to why he had
no wife or girlfriend and joked that one had to be married to work at
the plant. One supervisor told Goluszek that he should "get married
Ala. May 22, 1996); Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., No. CIV.A. 94-1483, 1995
WL 133349 at *2 (E.D. La. Mar. 24, 1995); Wrightson v. Pizza Hut of Am., Inc., 909 F.
Supp. 367, 368 (W.D.N.C. 1995); Mayo v. Kiwest Corp., 898 F. Supp. 335, 337 (E.D. Va.
1995); Quick v. Donaldson Co. Inc., 895 F. Supp. 1288, 1295-96 (S.D. Iowa 1995); Sarff v.
Continental Express, 894 F. Supp. 1076, 1082 (S.D. Tex. 1995); Benekritis v. Johnson, 882
F. Supp. 521, 526 (D.S.C. 1995); Fox v. Sierra Dev. Co., 876 F. Supp. 1169, 1176 (D. Nev.
1995); Myers v. City of El Paso, 874 F. Supp. 1546, 1548 (W.D. Tex. 1995); Hopkins v.
Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co., 871 F. Supp. 822, 833-34 (D. Md. 1994); Vandeventer v. Wa-
bash Nat'l Corp., 867 F. Supp. 790, 796 (N.D. Ind. 1994) (hereinafter Vandeventer (I)), on
motion to reconsider, Vandeventer v. Wabash Nat'l Corp., 887 F. Supp. 1178, 1179 (N.D.
Ind. 1995) (hereinafter Vandeventer (II)) (holding that "[s]ame-sex harassment is not ac-
tionable ... may have been overbroad"); Goluszek v. Smith, 697 F. Supp. 1452 (N.D. Ill.
1988). One circuit court recently held that there is no Title VII cause of action for a same-
sex hostile environment claim "where both the alleged harassers and the victim are heter-
osexuals of the same sex," leaving open the availability of a cause of action where either
the harasser or victim is homosexual. McWilliams v. Fairfax County Bd., 72 F.3d 1191,
1195 (4th Cir. 1996). For a criticism of this approach of focusing on the sexual orientation
of the parties, see infra notes 42, 74 and accompanying text.
28. Vandeventer (1), 867 F. Supp. at 792, 796 (holding that "same-sex harassment is
not actionable" in case where plaintiff charged both hostile environment and quid pro quo
sexual harassment), on motion to reconsider, Vandeventer (11), 887 F. Supp. at 1179.
29. This is not to suggest that a same-sex quid pro quo claim would get a better recep-
tion from these courts than a same-sex hostile environment claim. The recitation of the
parties' contentions in some written opinions simply does not reveal the precise doctrinal
basis for the plaintiff's sexual harassment claim. See, e.g., Garcia, 28 F.3d at 449 (plaintiff
complained of being "sexually harassed"). Thus, some of the cases may well have involved
a rejected same-sex quid pro quo claim. Further, the reasoning employed by the courts
that have rejected same-sex sexual harassment claims seems sufficiently broad to reject
quid pro quo claims as well as hostile environment claims.
30. 697 F. Supp. 1452 (N.D. Il1. 1988).
31. Actually, the court in Goluszek somewhat gratuitously began its recitation of the
facts by noting that the Goluszek "has never been married nor has he lived anywhere but
at his mother's home." Id. at 1453.
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and get some of that soft pink smelly stuff that's between the legs of a
woman."32 On another occasion certain operators told Goluszek he
should go out with a female employee because she "fucks. ' 3 The op-
erators periodically asked Goluszek if he had gotten any "pussy" or
had oral sex, showed him pictures of nude women, "accused"' him of
being gay or bisexual, and made other sex-related comments.3 5 The
operators also poked him in the buttocks with a stick.3 6 When Golus-
zek complained to a supervisor that his co-workers were "out there
talking to me about butt-fucking in the ass," the supervisor dismissed
the statements as mere "shop talk. '37 Goluszek filed suit under Ti-
tle VII claiming that he had been sexually harassed by his male co-
workers.
In rejecting Goluszek's claim of same-sex harassment, the district
court sketched what I will call the "dominant gender" theory of Ti-
tle VII. The court conceded that Goluszek had demonstrated that
"but for" his sex he would not have been the object of harassment.
38
However, the court asserted that same-sex harassment did not fall
within the broad purpose of Title VII. "[T]he defendant's conduct
was not the type of conduct Congress intended to sanction when it
enacted Title VII. '39 Relying solely on a student note in a law journal
published two years before Meritor Savings, the court asserted that
the prohibition on sex discrimination in Title VII aimed to correct "an
imbalance of power and an abuse of that imbalance by the powerful
which results in discrimination against a discrete and vulnerable
group. ' 4° The sexual harasser "is saying by words or actions that the
victim is inferior because of the victim's sex."'" The court cited
neither the language of Title VII nor its legislative history to reach
these conclusions about its purpose.
The court observed that "Goluszek was a male in a male-domi-
nated environment."'42 Thus, reasoned the court, he necessarily did




34. This is the court's verb, not mine.
35. Id. at 1454.
36. Id.
37. Goluszek, 697 F. Supp. at 1454 (internal quotations omitted).
38. Id. at 1456.
39. Id.
40. Id. (citing Note, Sexual Harassment Claims of Abusive Work Environment Under
Title VII, 97 HARV. L. REv. 1449, 1451-52 (1984)).
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Although he was harassed because he was male, "that harassment was
not of a kind which created an anti-male environment in the
workplace.""
The dominant gender theory of Goluszek-that same-sex harass-
ment does not violate Title VII because it cannot create a climate hos-
tile to the victim's sex or abuse the imbalance of power between the
sexes-has been followed by most of the courts rejecting same-sex
harassment claims.45  Indeed, these courts have offered almost no
other argument-aside from precedent-against the cause of action.46
Moreover, even though Goluszek was itself an abusive treatment case,
courts have also relied on its dominant gender rationale in unwelcome
sexual advances cases.47
44. Id.
45. Mayo v. Kiwest Corp., 898 F. Supp. 335,337 (E.D. Va. 1995) (to recognize a male-
on-male harassment claim "[t]his court would have to assume that such harassment of the
male subordinate prevented men from having the same employment opportunities as wo-
men."); Quick v. Donaldson Co., 895 F. Supp. 1288, 1295 (S.D. Iowa 1995) ("[T]he inquiry
under Title VII... is to ascertain whether the environment is anti-male or anti-female.");
Fox v. Sierra Dev. Co., 876 F. Supp. 1169, 1176 (D. Nev. 1995) (supervisors' conduct in
writing, drawing and explicitly discussing homosexual sex acts did not "inherently intimi-
date, ridicule or insult men" or "impl[y] a threat of violence towards men, hatred of men,
or ... humiliate[ ] or ridicule[ ]... men as such"); Vandeventer (1), 867 F. Supp. at 796
("Title VII is aimed at a gender-biased atmosphere; an atmosphere of oppression by a
'dominant' gender."), on motion to reconsider, 887 F. Supp. 1178, 1179 (N.D. Ind. 1995)
(court's initial holding that same sex sexual harassment is not actionable may have been
overbroad); Hopkins v. Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co., 871 F. Supp. 822, 833 (D. Md. 1994)
(The same-sex harasser "certainly does not despise the entire group [of his sex], nor does
he wish to harm its members, since he is a member himself and finds others of the group
sexually attractive.") (citation omitted).
46. One court, declining to decide whether the cause of action existed, cited the
"troubling possibility" of having "litigants debate and juries determine the sexual orienta-
tion of Title VII defendants" if the cause of action were allowed. Ryczek v. Guest Servs.,
Inc., 877 F. Supp. 754, 762 (D.D.C. 1995). In the case, the defendant argued that she was
"bisexual," and therefore accorded equal treatment to the sexes. Id. at 761. The plaintiff
argued that the defendant was a lesbian, and therefore targeted her harassment only at
women. Id. at 761-62. The court scoffed at the idea of "what would be legally sufficient to
submit the issue of a supervisor's bisexuality to a jury." Id. at 762 n.7. However, courts
need not inquire into a person's status as heterosexual, homosexual, or bisexual in order to
determine whether the person's conduct on the job discriminated on the basis of sex.
Courts would be well advised to avoid phrases like "homosexual harasser," "heterosexual
harasser," and "bisexual harasser," which misleadingly focus on the harasser's status and
not his conduct. For a recent example of this misplaced focus on the sexual orientation of
the parties, see McWilliams v. Fairfax County Bd. of Supervisors, 72 F.3d 1191, 1195 (4th
Cir. 1996) (disallowing same-sex hostile environment claim "where both the alleged harass-
ers and the victim are heterosexuals of the same sex."). The only proper focus of Title VII
is the harasser's conduct. See Tanner v. Prima Donna Resorts, Inc., 919 F. Supp. 351, 355
(D. Nev. 1996) (sexual orientation of parties is a nonissue, "[tihe focus should be on the
harassing conduct itself, and whether the harassment is 'because of sex."').
47. Mayo, 898 F. Supp. at 336-37; Benekritis, 882 F. Supp. at 523-26.
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2. Unwelcome Sexual Advances v. Abusive Treatment
In at least four cases rejecting a cause of action for same-sex har-
assment based on abusive treatment, courts have suggested that a dif-
ferent result might be reached in the case of a sexual quid pro quo or a
hostile environment theory based on unwelcome homosexual sexual
advances. In Quick v. Donaldson Co., co-workers repeatedly sub-
jected the heterosexual plaintiff to both physical and verbal assaults.'
One type of physical assault, called "bagging" by the co-workers, con-
sisted in having one employee lift the plaintiff off the ground while a
second employee grabbed the plaintiff's testicles. 9 Verbal assaults in-
cluded writing the word "Queer" on the plaintiff's ID card, telling
other employees to "Watch that guy, he's gay," writing "Gay and
Proud" on the plaintiff's belt loop, placing a tag in the plaintiff's work
area stating "pocket lizard licker," and suggesting he had committed
"some deviant activity with a cucumber. '50 The court characterized
the case as involving "heterosexual male-to-male sexual harass-
ment."'5 1 The court rejected the plaintiff's claim on the familiar
ground that such harassment could not create a gender-biased atmos-
phere characterized by oppression from a dominant gender.52 How-
ever, the court took pains to point out that "heterosexual male-to-
male harassment may present issues different from homosexual male-
to-male sexual harassment,"5 3 and distinguished cases involving un-
welcome homosexual sexual advances.54 Even courts holding that Ti-
tle VII does protect employees from same-sex harassment have
distinguished Goluszek on the ground that it "involved sexual teasing
of a heterosexual male by other heterosexual males rather than sexual
48. 895 F. Supp. at 1291.
49. Id. at 1292.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 1294; see also McWilliams 72 F.3d at 1195 (disallowing harassment claim
where parties are same-sex heterosexuals); Martin v. Norfolk Southern Ry. Co., No CV-
94-N-2928-S, 1996 WL 283911 at *5-*6 (N.D. Ala. May 22, 1996) ("heterosexual teasing"
case disallowing same-sex harassment claim).
52. Id. at 1294-95.
53. Id. at 1294.
54. Id. at 1297 n.7; see also Hopkins, 871 F. Supp. at 835 ("None of the alleged inci-
dents of sexual harassment.., involved implicit-or explicit requests or demands for sexual
favors."); Fox, 876 F. Supp. at 1172 (abusive treatment claim asserting hostile environment
theory; "There are no facts alleged indicating a quid pro quo form of harassment exis-
ted."); Childress v. City of Richmond, 907 F. Supp. 934, 939 (E.D. Va. 1995) ("Title VII
permits no claim for hostile environment based on same-sex harassment where there is
neither an allegation of quid pro quo nor some sexual component of the harassing
behavior.").
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harassment of a subordinate by a homosexual supervisor.' '5 5 Neither
Quick nor any other court has identified the doctrinal or logical basis
for distinguishing abusive treatment from unwelcome sexual advances
claims in the context of same-sex harassment. No such distinction is
recognized for opposite-sex hostile environment claims.
5 6
In abusive treatment cases, the courts that have rejected same-sex
harassment claims have been especially alert to deny any claim that
seems to be based on discrimination or abuse aimed at a victim be-
cause of her actual or perceived sexual orientation. These courts
often invoke the settled principle that Title VII forbids discrimination
on the basis -of sex, not sexual orientation. The typical case in this
category involves taunts directed at a co-worker or subordinate who
is, or is suspected to be gay. 7
3. Same-Sex Sexual Harassment in the Fifth Circuit
,For practitioners in the Fifth Circuit, recognition of same-sex sex-
ual harassment claims will be an uphill battle. In Garcia v. Elf
Atochem North America, the appellate court rejected a sexual harass-
ment claim by a male employee against his superior.5 Freddy Garcia,
the plaintiff, alleged that his supervisor approached him from behind
55. EEOC v. Walden Book Co. Inc., 885 F. Supp. 1100, 1102 (M.D. Tenn. 1995);
Tietgen v. Brown's Westminster Motors, Inc., 921 F.Supp. 1495 (E.D. Va. 1996) (suggesting
that there is no cause of action for mere locker room antics, joking, or horseplay); see also
Ecklund v. Fuisz Tech., Ltd., 905 F. Supp. 335, 338 (E.D. Va. 1995) (same-sex sexual ad-
vances case distinguishing Goluszek because it "involved a (heterosexual) male employee
. . . taunted by (heterosexual) male co-workers about his single status and lack of
girlfriends").
56. Opposite-sex harassment involving abusive treatment-as opposed to unwelcome
sexual advances-that creates a hostile working environment states a cause of action under
Title VII. Steiner v. Showboat Operating Co., 25 F.3d 1459, 1462 (9th Cir. 1994), cert.
denied, 115 S. Ct. 733 (1995) ("Trenkle was abusive to men and women alike; however, his
abusive treatment and remarks to women were of a sexual or gender-specific nature."); see
also EEOC regulations, 29 C.F.R. §§ 609.1, 1609.2 (sexual harassment includes "harass-
ment due to gender-based animus").
57. Sarff v. Continental Express, 894 F. Supp. 1076, 1079 (S.D. Tex. 1995) (discrimina-
tion designed to "impugn [plaintiff's] manhood" is not cognizable in part because Title VII
does not forbid sexual orientation discrimination); Fox, 876 F. Supp. at 1172 ("[P]laintiffs
must allege facts indicating the work environment was hostile to men qua men, not merely
hostile on the basis of sexual orientation or preference."); Id. at 1175 n.6 ("[s]uch discrimi-
nation, or harassment is not prohibited" by Title VII where environment is hostile to heter-
osexual workers because they are heterosexual or homophobic); Quick v. Donaldson, Inc.,
895 F. Supp. 1288, 1297 (S.D. Iowa 1995) (no Title VII action when male co-employees
targeted plaintiff for taunting and physical harassment "because they were under the false
impression that he was gay"); Hopkins, 871 F. Supp. at 832 n.17 (Title VII prohibits neither
sexual orientation discrimination nor "'sexual harassment' based on a belief that the victim
is homosexual") (citation omitted).
58. 28 F.3d 446, 452 (5th Cir. 1994).
710' [Vol. 37:699
SAME-SEX SEXUAL HARASSMENT
and "reach[ed] around and grab[bed] [Garcia's] crotch area and
ma[de] sexual motions from behind [Garcia]. '59 The court, relying on
a previous unpublished opinion held that "[h]arassment by a male su-
pervisor against a male subordinate does not state a claim under Ti-
tle VII even though the harassment has sexual overtones. Title VII
addresses gender discrimination. '6°  Under the circumstances, de-
clared the court, the supervisor's conduct "could not in any event con-
stitute sexual harassment within the purview of Title VII. 61 The Fifth
Circuit recently held that Garcia is binding precedent, despite the fact
that it offered the ruling on same-sex harassment as an alternative
holding.62
The Fifth Circuit in Garcia offered no analysis to support its con-
clusory statements about the coverage of Title VII. The court's state-
ment that same-sex harassment does not state a claim because
"Title VII addresses gender discrimination" 63 is a conclusion needing
an argument. Every court that has reviewed the matter agrees with
the Garcia truism that Title VII addresses gender (sex) discrimination.
The question, which the Fifth Circuit's conclusory argument avoids, is:
does the prohibition on sex discrimination apply in a case of same-sex
harassment?
Garcia has gotten a decidedly-and unusually-mixed reception
in the district courts within the Fifth Circuit. Three district courts in
the Fifth Circuit have relied on Garcia to reject same-sex sexual har-
assment claims.64 Despite the apparently clear directive from the
59. Id. at 448.
60. Id. at 451-52 (citation omitted).
61. Id. at 452.
62. Oncale v. Sundower Offshore Servs., No. 95-30510, 1996 WL 223627 at *3 (5th
Cir. May 20, 1996).
63. Id.
64. Myers v. City of El Paso, 874 F. Supp. 1546, 1548 (W.D. Tex. 1995) (unwelcome
sexual advances case); Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., No. CIV.A. 94-1483, 1995
WL 133349 at *2 (E.D. La. Mar. 24, 1995) (no cause of action under Title VII for male
against other male co-worker); Sarff, 894 F. Supp. at 1082 (abusive treatment case). In
Sarff, Judge Samuel Kent noted that gay employees have no statutory protection from
employment discrimination or same-sex sexual harassment in the "vast majority of states."
Id at 1081. In an extraordinary and rare statement of personal opinion, he added:
Nevertheless, this Court cannot pass over this legal fact in this case without com-
menting that the absence of a legal duty on [the] employer's part is not cotermi-
nous with the scope of a duty of good faith and fair dealing. This Court deeply
believes that discrimination against all Americans, despite their gender, race, reli-
gion, or sexual orientation, is profoundly wrong and that it violates the fundamen-
tal and essential right of individuals to engage in the full rights and privileges of
citizenship. In addition, it makes little economic sense for employers to discrimi-
nate against the 15-25 million gay and lesbian people in this country, many of
19961
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Fifth Circuit in Garcia, at least two district courts in the circuit have
held that same-sex harassment is actionable under Title VII.65 Both
of these cases have been implicitly overruled by the Circuit Court.66
Plaintiffs' only alternatives in the Circuit will be to request en banc
review, an unlikely prospect, or to take their cases to the Supreme
Court.
4. Retaliatory Discrimination For Complaining of Same-Sex Sexual
Harassment
Several courts have held that although Title VII does not cover
same-sex sexual harassment claims, such claims may nevertheless
form the basis for a retaliatory discrimination claim. That is, even
though the employer-supervisor may not be held liable for the under-
lying sexual harassment, she may be held liable for taking employ-
ment action against the employee in retaliation for the filing of a,
complaint based on same-sex harassment. 67 The courts that have per-
mitted retaliatory discharge claims in the context of same-sex harass-
ment have reasoned that the language of Title VII, 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000(e)(3)(a) extends a possible retaliation claim to anyone partici-
pating in proceedings under Title VII, if they have a reasonable belief
that a violation occurred, even if their claims are ultimately denied.68
Similarly, the so-called "opposition clause" of Title VII prohibits
adverse action against an individual if he had a reasonable and good
faith belief that the practice opposed constituted a violation of
Title VII.
69
Given the unsettled state of the law on same-sex sexual harass-
ment, litigants in every jurisdiction may well have a "reasonable and
good faith belief" that same-sex harassment is actionable even if the
claim is ultimately denied. Thus, practitioners may want to look
whom hold positions at the highest levels of professional, scientific, academic, and
political enterprises.
Id. (emphasis in original). Nevertheless, Judge Kent felt compelled by Garcia to reject the
plaintiff's claim. Id.
65. Pritchett v. Sizeler Real Estate Mgmt. Co., No. CIV.A. 93-2351, 1995 WL 241855,
at *2 (E.D. La. Apr. 25, 1995) (calling Garcia's rejection of same-sex harassment claims
"dicta," arguing that it would be "discriminatory" to exempt homosexual harassers from
Title VII strictures), affd without opinion, 44 F.3d 1004 (5th Cir. 1996); Castellano v.
Whole Foods Market, No. H-94-2675 (unpublished) (Garcia is "almost dicta" and "com-
pletely contradictory").
66. Oncale, 1996 WL at *3.
67. See, e.g., Benekritis, 882 F. Supp. at 526; Hopkins, 871 F. Supp. at 835; Goluszek,
697 F. Supp. at 1456-57.
68. See, e.g., Benekritis, 882 F. Supp at 526.
69. De Anda v. St. Joseph Hosp., 671 F.2d 850, 851-52 n.1 (5th Cir. 1982).
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closely at whether there is evidence that an employer took employ-
ment action against the same-sex harassment plaintiff in response to
her complaint.
III. CASES AND ARGUMENTS FOR A TITLE VII SAME-SEX SEXUAL
HARASSMENT CAUSE OF ACTION
A large and rapidly increasing number of district courts have held
that same-sex harassment does state a claim under Title VII.70 At
least two circuit courts, in dicta, have also indicated their approval of
the cause of action.71 The district courts approving the cause of action
have done so in the context of both quid pro quo and hostile environ-
ment claims. However, the hostile environment claims have uni-
70. See, e.g., Tietgen v. Brown's Westminster Motors, Inc., 921 F.Supp. 1495 (E.D. Va.
1996); Ton v. Information Resources, Inc., No. 95 C 3565, 1996 WL 5322 *5 (N.D. Ill Jan. 3,
.1996); Tanner v. Prima Donna Resorts, Inc., 919 F. Supp. 351 (D. Nev. 1996); Williams v.
District of Columbia, 916 F. Supp. 1, 7 (D.D.C. 1996); Sardinia v. Dellwood Foods, Inc.,
No. Civ. 94-5458, 1995 WL 640502, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 1, 1995), appeal granted, 1995 WL
710205 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 1, 1995); Castellano v. Whole Foods Market, Inc., No. H-94-2675
(S.D. Tex. Oct. 25, 1995) (unpublished); King v. M. R. Brown, Inc., 911 F.Supp. 161, 166
(E.D. Pa. 1995); Pritchett v. Sizeler Real Estate, No. 93-2351, 1995 WL 241855, at *2 (E.D.
La. Apr. 25, 1995); Boyd v. Vonnahmen, No. 93-CV-4358-JPG, 1995 WL 420040, at *3
(S.D. Ill. Mar. 29, 1995); Roe v. K-Mart Corp., No. Civ.A. 2:93-2372-18AJ, 1995 WL
316783, at *2 (D.S.C. Mar. 28, 1995); Easton v. Crossland Mortg. Corp., 905 F. Supp. 1368,
1378 (C.D. Cal. 1995); Ecklund v. Fuisz Tech., Ltd., 905 F. Supp. 335, 337 (E.D. Va. 1995);
Blozis v. Mike Raisor Ford, Inc., 896 F. Supp. 805, 806 (N.D. Ind. 1995); Nogueras v.
University of Puerto Rico, 890 F. Supp. 60, 62 (D.P.R. 1995); Griffith v. Keystone Steel &
Wire, 887 F. Supp. 1133, 1136 (C.D. Ill. 1995); Vandeventer v. Wabash Nat'l Corp., 887
F. Supp. 1178, 1180 (N.D. Ind. 1995); EEOC v. Walden Book Co., Inc., 885 F. Supp. 1100,
1104 (M.D. Tenn. 1995); Prescott v. Independent Life & Accident Ins. Co., 878 F. Supp.
1545, 1551 (M.D. Ala. 1995); McCoy v. Johnson Controls World Servs., Inc., 878 F. Supp.
229, 232 (S.D. Ga. 1995); Joyner v. AAA Cooper Transp., 597 F. Supp. 537, 541 (M.D. Ala.
1983); Wright v. Methodist Youth Servs., Inc., 511 F. Supp. 307, 310 (N.D. Il. 1981). For
discussion of actionable sexual harassment claims under Title VII see generally Gayle
Ecabert, Comment, An Employer's Guide to Understanding Liability for Sexual Harass-
ment Under Title VII: Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 55 U. CIN. L. REv. 1181 (1987).
71. The Seventh Circuit, in an influential opinion by Judge Posner, stated in dicta that
same-sex harassment might be actionable in "appropriate cases." Baskerville v. Culligan
Int'l Co., 50 F.3d 428, 430 (7th Cir. 1995). The District of Columbia circuit court, in dicta,
has strongly suggested that it would permit a same-sex harassment claim. Barnes v. Costle,
561 F.2d 983, 990 n.55 (D.C. Cir. 1977). Arguing that a female subordinate had been cho-
sen for sexual advances based on her sex, the court said:
It is no answer to say that a similar condition could be imposed on a male
subordinate by a heterosexual female superior, or upon a subordinate of either
gender by a homosexual superior of the same gender. In each instance, the legal
problem would be identical to that confronting us now-the exaction of a condition
which, but for his or her sex, the employee would not have faced.
Id. (emphasis added). The court repeated this statement in Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d
934, 942 n.7 (D.C. Cir. 1981). Because the cases were decided nineteen and fifteen years
ago, respectively, the dicta in Barnes and Bundy may be of limited persuasive value.
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formly involved unwelcome sexual advances. No court of which I am
aware has allowed a claim of same-sex abusive treatment, either di-
rected at the victim's (actual or perceived) sexual orientation or not,
to proceed.
A. Arguments for Recognition of a Same-Sex Sexual Harassment
Cause of Action I
Unlike courts rejecting same-sex harassment claims, which have
tended to offer little or no analysis or to rely solely on precedent,
courts recognizing the cause of action have made several arguments
on its behalf. This section summarizes those arguments.
1. The "Plain Language" of Title VII
Almost every court that has recognized the cause of action has
cited the "plain language" of Title VII in support of its conclusion.72
These courts reason that in choosing the gender-neutral term "sex,"
Congress did not limit Title VII to opposite-sex harassment. Nothing
in the text of the statute limits its effect to discrimination by members
of the opposite sex. Had Congress desired Title VII to prohibit only
opposite-sex harassment, it could have prohibited discrimination
against a "member of the opposite sex."'73 Further, Title VII prohibits
discrimination on the basis of the employee's sex; it does not mention
the defendant's sex.74 Similarly, the language of Supreme Court opin-
ions discussing sexual harassment is almost invariably sex-neutral, sug-
gesting that the Supreme Court regards the harasser's sex irrelevant to
the inquiry under Title VII.75
2. Congressional Intent and Legislative History
Goluszek and its progeny speak of the broad purpose of Title VII
as if they have divined the intent of Congress in adding "sex" to the
Title VII laundry list of prohibited employment criteria. However,
the Supreme Court has noted the absence of legislative history regard-
ing the inclusion of "sex" discrimination in Title VII.76 The word
72. See, e.g., McCoy, 878 F. Supp. at 232 Nogueras, 890 F. Supp. at 63; Prescott, 878
F. Supp. at 1550; Walden Book, 885 F. Supp. at 1103.
73. Prescott, 878 F. Supp. at 1550. Similarly, the text of Title VII prohibits "race"
discrimination, not merely discrimination against African Americans.
74. Nogueras, 890 F. Supp. at 63.
75. See, e.g., Meritor Savings, 477 U.S. at 64 ("Without question, when a supervisor
sexually harasses a subordinate because of the subordinate's sex, that supervisor 'discrimi-
nate[s]' on the basis of sex.").
76. Id. at 63-64.
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"sex" was added on the day before the legislation passed in the House
of Representatives in an effort to defeat the Civil Rights Act of
1964.7 7 Since the language of Title VII facially supports a same-sex
harassment claim, the interpretive burden should be on opponents of
the cause of action to find legislative history indicating a contrary con-
gressional intent. But there is no such legislative history.
Similarly, some courts following Goluszek argue that Congress in
1964 did not "foresee" that Title VII would cover same-sex sexual har-
assment. That is not a persuasive argument in the interpretation of
Title VII. Congress presumably did not "foresee" that courts would
use Title VII to prohibit any sexual harassment, including opposite-
sex harassment, which is now an entrenched part of sex discrimination
jurisprudence.
3. Same-Sex Harassment Is "But For" Sex Discrimination
As noted earlier, a claim of sex discrimination requires the plain-
tiff to show that she would not have been subject to harassment "but
for" her sex.78 For example, to sustain an action against a male for
opposite-sex sexual harassment, a woman must show that "but for"
her sex he would not have harassed her. That is, if she had been a
male she would not have been subject to the harassment. Numerous
courts recognizing a same-sex harassment claim have argued that
same-sex harassment meets the "but for" test for Title VII liability.
79
Some courts have had conceptual difficulties with the hypotheti-
cal case of the "bisexual harasser," one who harasses both men and
women.8 0 The specter of the "equal opportunity" harasser might be
77. Walden Book, 885 F. Supp. at 1103 n.6; 110 CONG. REC. 2577-84 (1964); see WIL.
LIAM N. ESKIDGE, JR. & PHILLIP P. FRICKEY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION;
STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 17 (1988); Bobbie Loper Flynt, Sex Dis-
crimination: Psychological Injury From Hostile Work Environment Sexual Harassment, 20
U. DAYTON L. REV. 1049, 1051-52 (1995); Vhay, supra note 18, at 331.
78. Polly, 825 F. Supp. at 138.
79. See, e.g., Walden Book, 885 F. Supp. at 1103-04 ("When a homosexual supervisor
is making offensive sexual advances to a subordinate of the same sex, and not doing so to
employees of the opposite sex, it absolutely is a situation where, but for the subordinate's
sex, he would not be subjected to that treatment."); Prescott, 878 F. Supp. at 1551 (when
supervisor harasses a male subordinate, but does not similarly proposition female subordi-
nates, "[blut for the [subordinate's] being male, the harassment would not have oc-
curred"); McCoy, 878 F. Supp. at 232 (to prove "but for" sex discrimination in same-sex
harassment case, female plaintiff "must show that her harasser 'did not treat male employ-
ees in a similar fashion"').
80. See, e.g., Prescott, 878 F. Supp. at 1551 n.6 (court would have to dismiss Title VII
claim "if the defendant supervisor could show that in addition to harassing a plaintiff of
one gender, he treated those of the other gender with similar disrespect"). But see McDon-
nell v. Cisneros, No. 95-1864, 1996 WL 266561 at *4 (7th Cir. May 20, 1996) (stating that it
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thought a reason to reject same-sex sexual harassment claims
altogether.
On the other hand, it is unlikely that a harasser would expose
both sexes to truly equivalent amounts and types of harassment.
Again, it is the defendant's conduct (his treatment of males and fe-
males), not his status (in this case, a "bisexual"), that should guide a
court's inquiry into the existence of sex discrimination.8 ' It seems
probable that the evidence in a given case will almost always show
that a harasser "favors" one sex over the other. When a preference
for targeting one sex over the other is evident, as demonstrated by
more frequent or more intensive harassment of one sex, the harasser
discriminates on the basis of sex.8 The differing types of harassment
to which the "bisexual" harasser subjects his victims may also reveal
sex discrimination.83
4. Rejection of Dominant Gender Theory for Title VII Liability
Several of the courts recognizing same-sex sexual harassment
claims have criticized the reliance of Goluszek and its progeny on
dominant gender theory. Some courts have noted that there is no ba-
sis in Title VII jurisprudence for the requirement that harassment cre-
ate a generalized "anti-male" or "anti-female" atmosphere before
courts recognize an action for sexual harassment.' Another court has
pointed out the practical difficulties of determining whether a given
work environment is "anti-male" or "anti-female":
Does an all-male environment mean that it is also a "pro-male"
environment? Is a workplace "anti-female" only if all female
employees suffer harassment? Or is it enough if over half are
harassed? In a workplace that is not "anti-male" or "anti-fe-
male," however that determination is made, cannot one man or
would be "exceedingly perverse" to read Title VII to permit harassment of both sexes);
Chiapuzio v. BLT Operating Corp., 826 F. Supp. 1334, 1337 (D. Wyo. 1993) (stating that
"the equal harassment of both genders does not escape the purview of Title VII").
81. Tanner, 919 F. Supp. at 355.
82. See McCoy, 878 F. Supp. at 232 (harassing defendant escapes Title VII liability
only if he treats both sexes "in a similar fashion"); Raney, 892 F. Supp. at 288 ("only in the
rare case when the supervisor harasses both sexes equally can there be no sex
discrimination").
83. See Chiapuzio, 826 F. Supp. at 1337-38 (allowing action where defendant harasser
made sexual advances on female employees, but made sexually suggestive comments to
male employees about potential sexual encounters with their wives).
84. See, e.g., Walden Book, 885 F. Supp. at 1102 (Goluszek's theory "is contrary to the
law regarding sexual harassment in the Sixth Circuit"); Prescott, 878 F. Supp. at 1550 (Go-
luszek's theory "is not the current state of anti-discrimination jurisprudence").
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woman employee still be sexually discriminated against by a
supervisor?'
Many courts have permitted so-called "reverse discrimination"
claims, involving suits by males against women or by whites against
blacks, to proceed under Title VII. 6 Courts have reasoned that it
would be indefensible to permit these reverse discrimination suits but
to disallow same-sex sexual harassment cases under Title VII.87 The
Prescott court pointed out that if the dominant gender theory pre-
vailed, then a similar argument could be made when a white plaintiff
attempted to sue for discrimination. "[The] white plaintiff would have
been at all times a member of the majority, a member of the 'domi-
nant' race," argued the court. 88
Further, the identity of the harasser is irrelevant to consideration
of whether the plaintiff states a claim under Title VII. For example,
black-on-black racial discrimination is cognizable under Title VII89.
Similarly, in deciding whether to dismiss a plaintiff's opposite-sex har-
assment claim, a court need not inquire into the harasser's sex.
Courts adopting the dominant gender model have concocted a
"victim group"-rather than an "individual victim"-approach to Ti-
tle VII liability. These courts have suggested that the idea of same-sex
harassment is somehow "illogical," in part because victims of same-
sex harassment would have a hard time proving that the harassment
created an atmosphere of hostility towards all members of the victim's
(and harasser's) sex.90 For example, in rejecting same-sex harassment
as actionable under Title VII, the Maryland District Court, in Hopkins
v. Baltimore Gas & Electirc Co., argued that same-sex harassment
could not satisfy Title VII because the harasser "certainly does not
despise the entire group [of his sex], nor does he wish to harm its
members, since he is a member himself and finds others of the group
sexually attractive." 91
There are two flaws in this reasoning. First, there is no require-
ment in Title VII law or theory that a victim show that her harasser
despised all members of her sex. The victim need only show that she,
85. Sardinia, 1995 WL 640502 at *7 n.5.
86. Id. at 5-6.
87. Prescott, 878 F. Supp. at 1550 n.5
88. Id. at 1550.
89. Parrott v. Cheney, 748 F. Supp. 312, 316 (D. Md. 1989) (same race discrimination
is possible in a case where a black employee brought action against a black supervisor).
90. See supra notes 38-47 and accompanying text.
91. Hopkins, 871 F. Supp. at 833.
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an individual, was harassed because of her sex.92 If the novel proposi-
tion in Hopkins and similar dominant gender cases were applied to
opposite-sex harassment almost no plaintiff could maintain suit. In
almost every case, the defendant could successfully argue that the suit
is barred because "he finds [the victim and] others of the group sexu-
ally attractive." There is no precedent in Title VII jurisprudence for
such a remarkable defense. Second, the Hopkins court and others fol-
lowing the dominant gender model evidently do not consider that sex-
ual harassment against members of one's own sex, like sexual
harassment of members of the opposite sex, might be an expression of
self-loathing and/or power abuse rather than sexual attraction. At the
very least, the sexual-attraction thesis of Hopkins has no place in an
abusive treatment sexual harassment case.
5. Homosexuals Should Not be Exempt from Work-Place
Restrictions Placed on Heterosexuals
At least one court favoring a cause of action for same-sex harass-
ment (in unwelcome sexual advances cases) has relied on thinly veiled
"special rights"-type rhetoric and stereotypes of gay sexuality to do
so. In Pritchett v. Sizeler Real Estate Management Co., the court
averred that it would be "discriminatory" to allow a supervisor to es-
cape Title VII "solely because of that supervisor's sexual orienta-
tion. '9 3 To deny a claim for same-sex harassment would be to allow
the homosexual supervisor to engage in the very activity that would be
prohibited a heterosexual supervisor, warned the court.94 Homosexu-
als, argued the court, should not be "exempt" from "the very laws that
govern the workplace conduct of heterosexuals." 95
Without saying so directly, the court seemed to suggest that deny-
ing claims for same sex harassment would give homosexuals a "special
right" to engage in harassment not enjoyed by heterosexuals. This
notion that homosexuals should not be given a special place in the
eyes of the law has been repeatedly used to defeat or repeal anti-dis-
crimination legislation designed to prohibit sexual orientation discrim-
ination, most recently and famously in the dispute over Colorado's
Amendment 2. In Pritchett, ironically, a form of this "special rights"
argument is used to argue for legal recognition of homosexuality as a
92. See Sardinia, 1995 WL 640502 at *7 n.5 ("I understand Title VII to create an
individual cause of action. Its prohibitions are not stayed until a work environment has
been poisoned for all the members of one gender or the other.").





category of concern and analysis. The Pritchett court did so, of course,
because it conceptualized the recognition of same-sex sexual harass-
ment claims as a form of "restriction" on homosexuals in the work
place, rather than a "right" homosexuals would enjoy.
The court reassured readers of the opinion that Title VII does not
protect a homosexual from discrimination based on sexual orienta-
tion, but added that "here it is not the homosexual who seeks to be
protected."' In its concern to place homosexuals under the same re-
strictions as heterosexuals, the Pritchett court ignored the possibility
that a homosexual might himself be subjected to unwelcome same-sex
advances. The tableau the court painted is one in which opportunistic
homosexuals, free from legal restraint, sexually pursue unwilling
heterosexuals. Perhaps, unconsciously, the court cannot fathom that
homosexuals could ever be subject themselves to "unwelcome" sexual
advances or harassment by members of the same sex. As a result, the
court notes that its opinion is not designed to protect homosexuals.
Some practitioners may find it distasteful to rely on implicit anti-
gay stereotyping and "special rights" arguments to gain acceptance of
a same-sex sexual harassment cause of action. Moreover, such ar-
guments will only support the cause of action in a case involving un-
welcome sexual advances or a quid pro quo. Workplace abusive
treatment by members of the same sex will escape Title VII liability.
However, depending on the jurist the practitioner confronts, a Pritch-
ett-style analysis may be the only successful avenue.
6. EEOC's Interpretation
The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission interprets Title
VII to bar same-sex sexual harassment. After stating that "a man as
well as a woman may be the victim of sexual harassment,"97 the
EEOC's Compliance Manual concludes:
The victim does not have to be of the opposite sex from the
harasser. Since sexual harassment is a form of sex discrimina-
tion, the crucial inquiry is whether the harasser treats a member
or members of one sex differently from members of the other
sex. The victim and the harasser may be of the same sex where,
for instance, the sexual harassment is based on the victim's sex
... and the harasser does not treat employees of the opposite
sex the same way.98
96. Id.
97. EEOC Compliance Manual (CCH) § 615.2(b)(1) (1993).
98. Id. § 615.2(b)(3).
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Although agency interpretations of federal statutes are not binding on
federal courts, they are persuasive authority. 99 In Meritor Savings, the
Supreme Court relied heavily on EEOC guidelines in recognizing hos-
tile environment claims as a form of sexual harassment, and therefore
as a form of sex discrimination. 100
7 Same-Sex Harassment Is No Less Harmful to the Victim than
Opposite-Sex Harassment
Same-sex harassment is no less severe than opposite-sex harass-
ment. Further, it does not lessen the factors that must be weighed in
deciding whether, under the totality of the circumstances, the harass-
ment created a hostile environment for the employee. 1 1
Under the "totality of the circumstances" test laid out in Harris v.
Forklift Systems, Inc. ,102 courts examine, among other things, the fre-
quency of the discriminatory conduct, its severity, whether it is physi-
cally threatening or humiliating, and whether it unreasonably
interferes with an employee's work. These factors simply do not vary
depending upon the sex of the harasser. Same-sex harassment can be
just as frequent, just as severe, just as threatening and humiliating, and
just as disruptive to work as opposite-sex harassment.
8. Equal Protection
One court has argued that unless Title VII is read to make same-
sex sexual harassment actionable it may be subject to attack on consti-
tutional equal protection grounds.1 3 Although this argument has not
been fully articulated by any court, it urges a reading of Title VII that
would avoid unconstitutionality, a common cannon of statutory
construction.
B. Same-Sex Harassment Based on Abusive Treatment
Even some courts sympathetic to a cause of action for same-sex
sexual harassment have been careful to limit it to cases involving un-
welcome homosexual advances. This section considers those cases
99. Polly, 825 F. Supp. at 137 (relying on EEOC interpretation regarding same-sex
harassment); Sardinia, 1995 WL 640502 at *6 (same).
100. 477 U.S. at 65-66 (EEOC Guidelines "'while not controlling upon the courts by
reason of their authority, do constitute a body of experience and informed judgment to
which courts and litigants may properly resort for guidance"').
101. Sardinia, 1995 WL 640502 at *6.
102. 510 U.S. at 19.




and then offers a suggestion for placing same-sex sexual harassment
claims based on abusive (often anti-gay) treatment within the frame-
work of dominant gender theory and/or standard sex discrimination
doctrine.
1. Recognition of a Same-Sex Harassment Cause of Action Limited
by Dominant Gender Theory
In the context of same-sex abusive treatment claims, some courts
have adopted what amounts to an intermediate approach between
non-recognition and recognition of the claims. These courts do not
categorically reject the possibility of such a claim, but sharply limit the
scope of such a claim to those circumstances that demonstrate hostil-
ity to the victim's own sex-for example, an "anti-male" atmosphere
if the victim is a man. Thus, these cases borrow from the dominant
gender theory of Title VII liability.
In Vandeventer v. Wabash National Corp.,"° a male co-worker
called the male plaintiff a "dick sucker," told him to "drop down,"
asked him whether he could perform fellatio without his false teeth,
and asked the plaintiff if he would go with him to a gay bar.'05 On the
defendant's motion for summary judgment, the court initially categor-
ically rejected the plaintiff's same-sex harassment claim. 106 On plain-
tiff's motion to reconsider, the court retreated from its categorical
rejection of same-sex harassment claims, saying that male-on-male
sexual harassment can be actionable if it demonstrates "anti-male
bias" or an "anti-male atmosphere.' °7 The court dutifully noted that
"[p]eople who are harassed because they are homosexual (or are per-
ceived as homosexual) are not protected by Title VII any more than
are people who are harassed for having brown eyes.' 0 8 The court
also noted that harassment that involves offensive sexual behavior
"but is not based on gender bias does not state a claim under Title
VII."
109
The court observed that cases of male prejudice against males or
female prejudice against females would be "rare." The offensive, abu-
sive comments of the defendant in Vandeventer did not evince the
104. 867 F. Supp. at 796.
105. Id. at 796.
106. Id. (relying on Goluszek dominant gender theory).
107. Vandeventer (II), 887 F. Supp. at 1181. Vandeventer (II) was decided one month
prior to Blozis v. Mike Raisor Ford, Inc. which offered identical reasons to reach the same
conclusion. 896 F. Supp. 805 (N.D. Ind. 1995).
108. Vandeventer (II), 887 F. Supp. at 1180.
109. Id. at 1181 & n.2 (abuse must be based on the "harasser's disdain for the victim's
gender").
1996]
SOUTH TEXAS LAw REVIEW
"anti-male" atmosphere required for Title VII liability, according to
the court. "Absent extenuating circumstances," concluded the court,
"it would seem difficult to prove that sexually explicit words or con-
duct between men would demonstrate an anti-male atmosphere. '"110
A case reaching a conclusion similar to Vandeventer involved nu-
merous incidents of offensive and abusive sexually-explicit remarks
among women. In Easton v. Crossland Mortgage Corp.,"' another
pure abusive treatment case, the court allowed the theoretical possi-
bility of a same-sex sexual harassment claim based on a hostile envi-
ronment theory but observed that it would be hard for a plaintiff to
prevail on such claims. 112 The court asserted that conduct of a sexual
nature between women or conduct that is "gender-oriented" could not
be "presumptively discriminatory," even though it would be if the
same conduct were aimed by a male at a female." 3 Why?
Communications among women do not carry the same societal
baggage that creates the inequities Title VII seeks to correct.
The sexual or gender-oriented conduct occurs within an envi-
ronment removed from the concerns about male dominance and
sexual violence. The imbalance of power resulting from a domi-
nant gender disadvantaging a subservient [one] does not figure
into the exchanges between the parties." 4
Vandeventer and Easton thus accept the premise of Goluszek that
Title VII requires the assertion of power by a dominant gender over a
subordinate one, but diverge from Goluszek's conclusion. They mod-
ify Goluszek by allowing the theoretical possibility that a same-sex
harassment plaintiff might be able to show the requisite sex bias.
However, neither case outlines the type of evidence of harassment
that might successfully meet the difficult challenge of proving such
bias.
2. Same-Sex Abusive Treatment as a Form of Gender Dominance
Even if we accept Goluszek's dominant gender theory of Title
VII, litigants might argue that recognition of same-sex harassment in
the abusive environment context supports the underlying rationale for
the statute that Goluszek and its progeny have identified. Courts like
Goluszek, Vandeventer, and Easton plausibly claim that the basic pur-
110. Id. at 1182; see also Blozis, 896 F. Supp. at 808 (noting that it would be "[d]ifficult,
but not impossible" to prove an anti-male atmosphere in a male-on-male harassment
context).
111. 905 F. Supp. 1368 (C.D. Cal. 1995).
112. Id. at 1384 n.12.
113. Id. at 1382-83.
114. Id. at 1383.
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pose of Title VII is to remove an imbalance of power between the
sexes. They reason from this premise that male-on-male or female-
on-female sexual harassment does not touch on the male-female
power imbalance. Indeed, most of the sex-discrimination litigation
following the enactment of Title VII has involved discrimination by
men against women. 115 Courts have recognized that unwelcome sex-
ual advances or nonsexual "horseplay" or sex-biased taunting and rid-
icule can have a damaging effect on the ability of women (or men) to
succeed in the workplace. 1 6 Whether the behavior takes the form of
a sexual advance or just sex-biased teasing, it constitutes sex discrimi-
nation if sufficiently pervasive to create a hostile environment for the
victim.
When the sex discrimination is directed by a man against a
woman, it is easy to see its potentially discriminatory and harmful ef-
fect on the environment in which all women must work. Consider the
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins litigation in which male partners failed to
promote a woman to partner at least in part because of her alleged
unfeminine qualities." 7 Several male partners felt she did not act like
a woman is "supposed" to act, was abrasive, macho, and foul-
mouthed.
On the other hand, when abusive treatment is directed by a man
against a man or a woman against a woman, the connection to a male-
female power imbalance is harder to see at first glance. A sort of
intra-sex "boys will be boys" rationale to excuse same-sex abusive
treatment emerges from the Goluszek line of cases. One court has
gone so far as to describe intra-sex "horseplay" as "sexually neu-
tral." 8 A line of cases is emerging that would disallow any Title VII
claims where the same-sex harassment involves only this kind of abu-
sive treatment.
However, same-sex "horseplay" or "shop talk" often both reflects
and reinforces expectations about proper sex or gender roles-expec-
tations that themselves may have a retarding effect on the success of
women in the workplace. Consider again the male-on-male "shop
talk" present in Goluszek. Much of the harassment aimed at Anthony
115. See Nogueras v. University of P.R., 890 F. Supp. 60, 62 (D.P.R. 1995).
116. See, e.g., Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 114 S. Ct. 367, 370-71 (1993) ("A discrimina-
torily abusive environment ... can and often will detract from employees' job perform-
ance, discourage employees from remaining on the job, or keep them from advancing in
their careers.").
117. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 235 (1989).
118. Tietgen v. Brown's Westminster Motors, Inc., 921 F. Supp. 1495, 1501 (E.D. Va.
1996).
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Goluszek, a male, reflected deep prejudices about the role of women
and men. In the world of Goluszek's co-workers, men were expected
to marry women and were somehow suspect or less worthy of civil
treatment if they did not. Women were reduced to sexual objects ex-
isting solely for the satisfaction of men. The Goluszek court failed to
place this male-on-male harassment in the context of male-female re-
lations. Consider, again, the Price Waterhouse litigation, but imagine
that the female employee had been discriminated against by female
partners for not meeting traditional gender expectations. Would the
effect on her progress have been any less real, or any less based on her
sex, or any less constricting on the role of women in the workplace
generally?
Male-on-male or female-on-female harassment can have the pur-
pose or effect of enforcing the very gender expectations and sex roles
that retard women's progress relative to men in the workplace. In
other words, when "boys are being boys" around each other in the
workplace, they reinforce a code of behavior that indirectly affects
women, constricting the choices women may have in pursuing eco-
nomic success because of the expectations men harbor-and act
upon-in their workplace relationships with women. Women's own
traditional expectations of the role to be played by other women may
have a similar reinforcing effect of constricting sex and gender roles.
Therefore, we cannot properly speak of "an environment removed
from the concerns about male dominance and sexual violence."119 In
fact, it may turn out that the intra-sex enforcement of traditional roles
for men and women ultimately has a more profound and pervasive
discriminatory effect than direct male-on-female harassment. Far
from being outside the "underlying rationale" for the prohibition on
sex discrimination in Title VII, recognition of same-sex abusive treat-
ment claims may be at the heart of Title VII.
This conclusion should be equally applicable where the same-sex
abusive treatment takes the form of a anti-gay harassment. Such har-
assment should fit within the gender dominance model of Title VII
liability. Consider that anti-gay harassment often relies on precisely
the same stereotypes about gender roles that sex discrimination draws
upon. In Goluszek, for example, the plaintiff's co-workers used de-
rogatory remarks about women even as they "accused" the plaintiff of
being gay or bisexual. 120 When one co-worker impugns the manhood
119. Easton v. Crossland Mortg. Corp., 905 F. Supp. 1368, 1383 (C.D. Cal. 1995) (em-
phasis added).
120. 697 F. Supp. at 1453-54.
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of another for being gay, he employs stereotypes about both gay men
and the relationship between men and women. Indeed, heterosexual-
ity is embedded in the traditional concept of what it means to be a
"man" or a "woman." These stereotypes and traditional concepts
about the proper roles of men and women, as discussed above, have
the purpose or effect of constricting the choices that members of
either sex may make-or have available to them-in the workplace.
3. Anti-Gay Abusive Treatment as a Form of Sex Discrimination
Even courts reluctant to accept the gender dominance model of
Title VII liability might be persuaded that anti-gay harassment in the
form of abusive treatment is a subset of sex discrimination. Argu-
ments that Title VII forbids discrimination on the basis of sexual ori-
entation have been, and likely will continue to be, unsuccessful.
Litigants might consider, instead, arguing that harassment based on
actual or perceived sexual orientation is a form of "sex" discrimina-
tion, which Title VII unquestionably prohibits.
Instead of asserting that Title VII forbids sexual orientation dis-
crimination outright, litigants might, for example, argue that in cases
of anti-gay male harassment the perpetrator finds something about
male homosexuals that is particularly revolting or threatening and
therefore disproportionately the object of abuse.121 In this hypotheti-
cal, the harasser would not treat a female homosexual in that way be-
cause he finds gay women less threatening, less revolting, and so forth.
It is the nexus of the victim's sex (male) and sexual orientation (gay)
that prompts the discrimination. This theory would capture discrimi-
nation that would not occur "but for" the male homosexual's sex.
Similar claims might be made where a harasser directs her abuse
solely or primarily at gay women. An employer clearly may not favor
gay men over gay women as a pretext for sex discrimination.'22 This
theory would, of course, also apply to opposite-sex sexual harassment
involving anti-gay abusive treatment.
Litigants might find evidentiary support for this theory in the fol-
lowing: the harasser's own statements; the vehemence and frequency
of the harasser's words or actions; the sex-specific language or behav-
ior directed at the victim; or the actual treatment accorded known or
suspected gay men and women in the workplace. The statement, "I
121. Compare Valdes v. Lumbermen's Mut. Cas. Co., 507 F. Supp. 10, 13 (S.D. Fla.
1980) (permitting claim under Title VII where employee alleged that the employer's "pol-
icy against employing homosexuals was not applied uniformly and was used against her
only because she is a female").
122. Id.
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hate faggots," would support a claim of sex-specific discrimination
claim; the statement, "I hate homosexuals," as an expression of hatred
against both gay men and women, would not. Other offensive epi-
thets like "dick sucker" or "butt fucker" or "pussy licker" would be
further evidence of sex-specific discrimination. Statements or actions
aimed at gay men, but not gay women, on the job would support a
finding of sex discrimination. Moreover, even if the harasser attacked
both gay men and gay women through words or deeds on the job, the
harasser might attack one or the other group with special vehemence,
vituperation or frequency. There will be an endless variety of fact pat-
terns, behavior, and epithets. The trier of fact will have to scrutinize
each case individually to determine whether the harasser singled out a
sex for special abuse. There is always the possibility, however remote,
that the harasser might be equally anti-gay male and anti-gay female,
in which case (as with the true "equal opportunity harasser") there
may not be a claim for discrimination on the basis of sex.
IV. CONCLUSION
The question whether Title VII forbids same-sex sexual harass-
ment, and if so, what forms of same-sex sexual harassment, will con-
tinue to plague the bench and bar until definitive word on the subject
comes from the Supreme Court. As of now, district courts across the
land are at odds over the question. Although the momentum seems to
favor recognition of the cause of action, courts have not applied it to
the common case involving abusive treatment of a member of the
same sex that does not involve an unwelcome sexual advance. Reso-
lution of the questions presented in this Article will require a theory
of what purpose courts should ascribe to Title VII's prohibition of sex
discrimination.
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